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Incomplete markets and excess demand functions  
First, it is assumed n-commodity, m-consumers in a pure trade economy with 
a set of {𝑢𝑖} , strictly quasi concave (the negative of quasiconvex) , monotone 
utility functions. 𝑓: ℝ𝑙 → 𝑅   is strictly quasi concave if 𝑓(𝜆𝑥1 +
(1 − 𝜆)𝑥2) > min {𝑓(𝑥1), 𝑓(𝑥2)},holds for all 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 ∈ ℝ
𝑙, with 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑥2 and 
all 𝜆 ∈ (0,1). 2 For each n+1 commodity in the Walrasian equilibrium model 
it is generated excess demand correspondence (𝑓1, 𝑓2 … … … . 𝑓𝑙+1) , 
Sonnenschein (1973), and the price functions and their domain is given as 𝑃 =
{𝑝1, 𝑝2 … … 𝑝𝑛}: 𝑝𝑖 > 0 , ∀ 𝑖 . For the purpose of analysis, it is assumed two-
commodity economy, and that there are no restrictions on the demand 
functions, i.e. demand depends on total income, the only restriction is 𝑝2𝑥2 =
𝑦 − 𝑝1𝑥1 where 𝑦 is income. The condition for continuity, Robbin, Joel W. 
(2010), here states that 𝑓 is said to be continuous on ℝ𝑙  if : 
equation 1 
∀𝑥0 ∈ ℝ
𝑙∀𝜖 > 0 ∃𝛿 > 0 ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑙[|𝑥 − 𝑥0| < 𝛿 |⇒ 𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑥0) < 𝜖|]  
In previous condition 𝜖 is trimmed price space 3, 𝑥0 is vector parameter , 
hence why the PDF is of a form 𝑓𝑥0(𝑥) = (𝑥 − 𝑥0) .One such function as in 
equation 1 would be 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥. And the previous function is not continuous 
is: 
equation 2 
 ∀𝑥0 ∈ ℝ
𝑙∀𝜖 > 0 ∃𝛿 > 0 ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑙[|𝑥 − 𝑥0| < 𝛿 and |𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑥0) ≥ 𝜖|].  
Uniformly continuous function is given as : 
                                                          
2 Quasi concave function would be 𝑓(𝜆𝑥 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑦) ≥ min {𝑓(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑦)} 
3 Trimmed space as a location parameter class of probability functions that is parametrized 
by scalar or vector valued parameter 𝑥0 which determines distributions or shift of the 
distribution.  
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equation 3 
∀𝜖 > 0  ∃𝛿 > 0∀𝑥0 ∈ ℝ
𝑙∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑙[|𝑥 − 𝑥0| < 𝛿 |⇒ 𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑥0) < 𝜖|] 
And is not strictly uniformly continuous function if : 
equation 4 
∀𝜖 > 0  ∃𝛿 > 0∀𝑥0 ∈ ℝ
𝑙∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑙[|𝑥 − 𝑥0| < 𝛿 |and 𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑥0) ≥ 𝜖|] 
Now if 𝑓: [𝑎, 𝑏] → 𝑅 and for some constant 𝐾 which is called Lipschitz 
constant  for ∀𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], then : 
equation 5  
 
|𝑓(𝑥1) − 𝑓(𝑥2)| ≤ 𝐾|𝑥1 − 𝑥2| 
Or: 
Equation 6 
𝑑𝑅(𝑓(𝑥1) − 𝑓(𝑥2)) ≤ 𝐾𝑑ℝ𝑙(𝑥1 − 𝑥2)
4 
Then the functions is called Lipschitz function and one can write ∈ Lip(𝑎, 𝑏) 
. Inverse mapping of Lipschitz is 𝑓−1: 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥. This continuous function 
𝑓: ℝ𝑛 → 𝑅 is an excess demand function of an n-commodity if for every 𝑝 in 
ℝ𝑙 , Walras’ Law with Equality 𝑝𝑓(𝑝) = 0, Debreu, (1974).But first let ℝ𝑛 =
{𝑝 ∈ 𝑅| 𝑝 ≫ 0, ‖𝑝‖ = 1} , which is the set of positive price vectors in 
Euclidean form.  Debreu (1974), defines also consumer as a pair (≲. 𝜔) , 
where 𝑒 is endowment vector in 𝑅+. Than a function 𝑓: ℝ
𝑙 → 𝑅 is said to be 
individual excess demand function of the consumer (≲. 𝜔) if for every price 
𝑝 in ℝ𝑙 , 𝜔 + 𝑓𝑝 is the greatest element for ≲ of {𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑙+|𝑝𝑥 ≤ 𝑝𝜔}.Now, as 
in Mantel (1974), the domain of utility functions of consumers {𝑢𝑖}  is his 
trade set Θ𝑙, is Θ𝑙 − 𝑏𝑖 , where 𝑖 = 1,2. . , 𝑙. Where 𝑏𝑖 is in the nonnegative 
                                                          
4 Distance d from 𝑥1 to 𝑥2 is |𝑥1 − 𝑥2|  
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orthant (like quadrant)  Θ𝑙, of the n-dimensional Euclidean space ℝ𝑛.𝐸𝑛 are 
n-trade commodity economies with a finite number of consumers. In addition, 
𝐹𝑛 is a set of all functions f-on a 𝜖- trimmed price space Θ𝑛(𝜖) =
{𝑝 ∈ Θ𝑙|𝜖 ≤ 𝑝𝑛 ≤ 1/𝜖}. In addition, these functions are continuous as 
previously shown, homogenous 𝑓(𝜆𝑝) = 𝑓(𝑝). Cardinal number 𝑓 of 𝐹𝑛 is >
𝑐 5, Hobson(1907). First, 𝐹-has a part which is equivalent tot the continuum. 
This is straightforward since functions such as 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑐, where 𝑐 is any 
number of the continuum , constitute such a part. It follows that 𝑓 ≥ 𝑐. Now, 
we assume that 𝐹 is equivalent to a part of the continuum, and it is proven that 
such a part cannot have a cardinal number< 𝑐. This 𝐹 –function can be ordered 
in the same type as the continuum, so that any assigned number in the 
continuum ξ , there corresponds a definite set of rules 𝑅ξ, which defines a 
function  𝑓ξ. The aggregate function 𝐹(𝑥) must contain every definable 
function of a real variable. We may consider  𝑓𝜉(ξ) as a function of ξ, because 
its value can be arithmetically determined and therefore is an element of 𝐹 
aggregate of all functions. Now to define a norm6, we choose a fixed number, 
let us say unity, we choose one, then the functions 𝜙(𝜉) = 𝑓𝜉(ξ) + 1, so now 
at each point ξ , value of unity is added. New definable function now is 𝜙(𝑥), 
but this cannot possibly belong to aggregate 𝐹, 𝜙(𝑥) cannot be identical with  
𝑓𝜉1(𝑥) ,  because 𝜙(𝜉1) and 𝑓𝜉1(𝜉1), they differ by unity. So now 𝐹 cannot be 
equivalent to the continuum and thus theorem 𝑓 > 𝑐 is put in practices, 
meaning that the aggregate of all functions of a real variable has a cardinal 
number 𝑓 higher than 𝑐.About the initial endowment of the consumer we 
assume that ∑ 𝜔 ≫ 0𝑖 . Initial endowment vector 𝜔𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑙. Ownership share of 
                                                          
5 The cardinal number of the aggregate of all functions defined for the rational points only 
is the cardinal number of the ways of distributing on the aggregate of rational numbers the 
aggregate number of continuum.  
6 A norm is a real valued function 𝜈 ⟼ ‖𝜈‖ 
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firms is 𝜃 ≥ 0, ∀ 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽. Vector of prices is 𝑝 = 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … . . , 𝑝𝑙 is said 
to be Walrasian if it “clears “ all of the markets, that is only if it solves L 
equations in L unknowns, Mas-Colell, A, and Whinston, M.,and Green, J.,, 
(1995) :𝑧(𝑝) = 0. This vector of prices is  the inverse demand function, in our 
case is F- function . And for n-consumers , their preferences are 𝑥𝑖 = ℝ+
𝑙  and 
≳𝑙 strictly convex
7 and strictly monotone. Now, a note on properties of 
preferences in terms of utilities, Obara.,I,(2012),: 
a) ≿ 𝑜𝑛  𝑋 8is locally nonsatiated if ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 , 𝜖 > 0, ∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 , ‖𝑦 − 𝑥‖ <
𝜖, ⋀ 𝑢(𝑦) > 𝑢(𝑥) 
b) ≿ 𝑜𝑛  𝑋 is monotone ⇔ 𝑥 ≫ 𝑦, ⋀ 𝑢(𝑦) > 𝑢(𝑥) , ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 , 𝑥 > 𝑦 ⇒
𝑥 ≳ 𝑦 
c) ≿ 𝑜𝑛  𝑋 is convex ⇔ 𝑢 is quasi concave 𝑢(𝑦) ≥ 𝑢(𝑥), 𝑢(𝑧) ≥
𝑢(𝑥), 𝑢(𝑎𝑦 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑧) ≥ 𝑥, ∀𝑎 ∈ [0,1] 
d) ≿ 𝑜𝑛  𝑋 is strictly convex ⇔ 𝑢 is strictly quasi concave 𝑢(𝑦) ≥
𝑢(𝑥), 𝑢(𝑧) ≥ 𝑢(𝑥), 𝑦 ≠ 𝑧, 𝑢(𝑎𝑦 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑧) > 𝑥, ∀𝑎 ∈ [0,1] 
e) Proposition : ≿ is differentially strictly convex if as in  Mas-Colell, 
A. (1986)9 , Jacobian determinant is nonsinugaler i.e. non zero: 
|
𝜕2𝑢(𝑥) 𝜕𝑢(𝑥)
[𝜕𝑢(𝑥)]𝑇 𝑂
| ≠ 0 
                                                          
7 Second welfare theorem: If all agents have convex preferences, then there always will be 
set prices such that Pareto Efficient allocation is a market equilibrium allocation for an 
appropriate assignment of endowments.  
8 Preference relation ≿ is a relation ≳⊂ ℝ+
𝑙 × ℝ+
𝑙 .With properties 𝑥 ≿ 𝑥, ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ+
𝑙  
(reflexivity), 𝑥 ≿ 𝑦, 𝑦 ≿ 𝑧 ⇒ 𝑥 ≿ 𝑧 (transitivity), ≿ is a closed set (continuity), ∀(𝑥 ≿
𝑦), ∃(𝑦 ≿ 𝑥)  (completeness) ,given ≳, ∀ (𝑥 ≫ 0) the at least good set {y: y ≳
x }is closed relative to 𝑅𝑙   (boundary condition), 𝐴 is convex, 𝑖𝑓 {y: y ≳
x }is convex set for every y , 𝑎𝑦 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥 ≳ 𝑥, whenever y ≳ x  𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 < 𝑎 < 1 , Mas-
Colell, A. (1986). 
9 Big O here may represent infinitesimal asymptotics  or a product of two matrices  
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Also as previous we assume that ∑ 𝜔 ≫ 0𝑖  (level of income or wealth), now 
the inverse aggregate demand function , 𝜑(𝑝, 𝜔) defined for all price vectors 
𝑝 ≫ 0, satisfies the following properties: 
a) 𝜑(∙) is continuous function on ℝ++𝑙 × ℝ+𝑙  
b) 𝜑(∙) is homogenous of degree zero ,  𝜑(𝛼𝑝, 𝛼𝜔) =
 𝜑(𝑝, 𝜔), ∀(𝑝, 𝜔),∗> 0 
c) 𝑝𝜑(𝑝) = 0 ∀𝑝 (Walras law)  
d) If 𝑝𝑙 → 𝑝, 𝑝 ≠ 0, 𝑝𝑙 = 0 for some 𝑙 so, max{𝜑1(𝑝
𝑙), … . . , 𝜑𝑙(𝑝
𝑙)} →
∞ 
e) About the set of prices… 𝑆𝜔 = {𝑝 ∈ 𝑆|∀𝑖, 𝑝𝑖 ≧ 𝜖 } , then 𝜑𝑙(𝑝) > −𝑠 
for every commodity 𝑙 and every 𝑝. 
f) Budget function can be given as : 𝛽(𝑝, 𝜔) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑅++
𝑙 : 𝑝 ∗ 𝑥 ≤ 𝜔} 
g) Expenditure function is ?̅?  ∈ 𝑢(𝑅++
𝑙 ) is defined as 𝑒𝑢 ∈ 𝑢(𝑅++
𝑙 ), and 
is homogenous of degreeone, concave, and of class , 𝐶1 (continuous 
differentiable whose derivative is continuous ,i.e. continuously 
differentiable, 𝜕𝑒𝑢(𝑝) =) = ℎ𝑢(𝑝)10. 
h) Proposition: ∀(𝑝, 𝜔), 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡. 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 𝜕𝑝𝜑(𝑝, 𝜔) +
𝜕𝜔𝜑(𝑝, 𝜔)(𝜑(𝑝, 𝜔))
𝑇
< 0, 𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 𝛼𝑖𝑗 =
?̅?𝑗𝑖  , 𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑝: {𝜐: 𝑝 ∙ 𝜐 = 0} 
The aggregate production function in this economy would be :𝑌 =
{𝑦 ∈ ℝ𝑙; 𝑦 ≤ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑎𝑗 ,(𝑎1, … . , 𝑎𝑗)𝑗 ≥ 0}. In previous function 𝛼𝑖𝑎𝑗 , are basic 
activities of the firms , i.e the vector of level activities . Because preferences 
are strictly monotone, there can be no free goods at an equilibrium. 
Equilibrium exist with a pair(𝑝, 𝑎), formed by a price vector 𝑝 ∈ 𝑆 𝑜𝑟 𝑝 ∈ ℝ+
𝑙 , 
if and only if :𝜑(𝑝) − ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑎𝑗 ,𝑗 = 0. Differentiability of the excess demand 
                                                          
10 Compensated demand function  
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function implies continuity. Now by differentiating both sides of 𝜑(𝜆𝑝) =
𝜑(𝑝) with respect to 𝜆 > 0 and then evaluating at 𝜆 = 1, we obtain: 
equation 7 
a) ∑
𝜕𝑧𝑙(𝑝)
𝜕𝑝𝑘
𝑘 𝑝𝑘 = 0     ∀ 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 [𝐷𝜑(𝑝)𝑝 = 0] 
b) ∑
𝜕𝑧𝑘(𝑝)
𝜕𝑝𝑙
𝑘 𝑝𝑘 = −𝜑𝑙(𝑝) ∀ 𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝 𝐷𝜑(𝑝)𝑝 = −𝜑(𝑝) 
These previous results come from Euler formula for homogenous functions. 
Formally, lets suppose that 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑙)  is homogenous of degree r (𝑟 =
⋯ . . , −1,0,1, … . ) and it is differentiable. Then at any (?̅?1, … . . , ?̅?𝑙)  there is : 
equation 8 
∑
𝜕𝑓(?̅?1,…..,?̅?𝑛)
𝜕𝑥𝑙
𝑛
𝑖=1 ?̅?𝑙 = 𝑟𝑓(?̅?1, … . . , ?̅?𝑙) or in matrix notation ∇𝑓(?̅?) ∗ ?̅? = 𝑟𝑓(?̅?) 
By definition, we have: 𝑓(𝑡?̅?1, … . . , 𝑡?̅?𝐿) − 𝑡
𝑟𝑓(?̅?1, … . . , ?̅?𝑙) = 0, 
differentiating previous with respect to t , we have ∑
𝜕𝑓(𝑡?̅?1,…..,𝑡?̅?𝑁)
𝜕𝑥𝑙
𝑛
𝑖=1 ?̅?𝑙 −
𝑟𝑡𝑟−1𝑓(?̅?1, … . . , ?̅?𝑙) = 0.For a function that is homogenous of degree zero 
Euler formula says : ∑
𝜕𝑓(?̅?1,…..,?̅?𝑙)
𝜕𝑥𝑙
𝑛
𝑖=1 ?̅?𝑙 = 0.   
Pseudoequilibrium in incomplete markets  
Pseudo equilibrium occurs if the initial share market is cleared and and share 
prices are positive at every date -event, provided that no consumer can be 
satiated at any event date pair. There exist two dates 0 and 1. This is a case of 
sequential trade under uncertainty. Equilibrium here is a set of prices at a first 
date, a set of common price expectations for the future, and a consistent set of 
individual plans for consumers and producers, so that each individual plan is 
optimal for the agent, given the appropriate budgetary constraints, Radner, R., 
(1972). So at date 1 trade exchange occurs and ℓ commodities are spot traded 
by the following prices 𝑝𝑠 ∈ ℝ++
𝑙  Furthermore, ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑐
𝑙
𝑖=1  is the commodity 
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claimed by the individual if state 𝑠 occurs, 𝑥𝑠𝑐 is commodity 𝑐 = 1,2 … , 𝐶 
produced. So that, ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑐
𝑙
𝑖=1 = 𝑥𝑠𝑐 , Arrow , K., (1953), assuming absence of 
saturation of individuals.  Economy is subject to restraint ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝑠𝑐 ∗
𝐶
𝑐=1
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑥𝑠𝑐 = 𝑦𝑖.Arrow sets theorem that is utility 𝑉𝑖(𝑥1, … . . , 𝑥𝑠𝑐) is quasiconcave  
for every individual 𝑖 , then any optimal risk bearing allocation can be realized 
by a system of competitive markets in claims on commodities. There are 
precisely 𝑆 types of securities11; unit of security of the sth type is a claim 
paying one monetary unit if state 𝑠 occurs and zero otherwise. Now, 𝑞𝑠 is the 
price of security ?̅?𝑠𝑐 = 𝑞𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑐. Price of securities is more precisely 𝑞𝑠 =
∑ ∑ ?̅?𝑠𝑐∗𝑥𝑠𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝑦
 , or 𝑞𝑠 =
𝑦𝑖
𝑦
. Budget restraint divided by income. Or 
∑ 𝑞𝑠 =
∑ ∑ ∑ ?̅?𝑠𝑐∗𝑥
∗
𝑖𝑠𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1
𝑆
𝑠=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑦
=
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑦
𝑆
𝑖=1 = 1. At date 0 there is trade on 𝐾 ≤
𝑆 assets, i.e. number of Arrow-Debreu securities is less or equal than the states 
of nature. Unit of assets 𝑘, delivers a return vector 𝛼𝑘𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝑠
𝑙  of goods if state 
𝑠 occurs. We also denote that 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑘 and 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑙𝑠 , these are the trade and 
consumption plans of agent 𝑖.Now by definition: The plans (?̅?, ?̅?) and prices 
𝑞 ∈ 𝑅𝑘 and 𝑝 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑙𝑠 constitute equilibrium if : 
Equation 9 
a) ∀(?̅?𝑖 , ?̅?𝑖), max 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖)  subject to 𝑞 ∗ 𝑦𝑖 ≤ 0, 𝑝𝑠𝑥𝑖𝑠 ≤ 𝑝𝑠𝜔𝑖𝑠 + ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑘(𝛼𝑘𝑠 ∗𝑘
𝑝𝑠), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀𝑠  
b) ∑ 𝑦𝑖 = 0𝑖  ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝜔𝑖) ≤ 0𝑖  
The pair (?̅?, ?̅?) ∈ 𝑅+
𝑙𝑠 × 𝑅+
𝑙𝑠𝑁  constitutes equilibrium if : 
a) ∀𝑥, max 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖)subject to 𝑝𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝜔𝑖 , ⋀(𝑝𝑖 ∗ (𝑥𝑖1 − 𝜔𝑖1), … . . , (𝑝𝑠 ∗ (𝑥𝑖𝑠 − 𝜔𝑖𝑠) ∈
𝐿(𝑝) ⊂ 𝑅𝑆 
b) ∑ (𝑥𝑖 − 𝜔𝑖) ≤ 0𝑖  
                                                          
11 When security is sold, when 𝑠 state occurs, money is transferred in a way determined by 
the securities, and the allocation of commodities occurs at market in a usual way, without 
further risk bearing.  
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Here we denote that 𝐺𝑆,𝐾 = {𝐿(𝑝) ⊂ 𝑅𝑆: 𝐿 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝐾 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒}, this is 
Grassman manifold12 of K planes in 𝑅𝑆 .And  for ∀𝑝 ⋀ 𝐿 ∈ ?̃?
𝑆,𝐾
= ⋃ 𝐺
𝑆,𝐾
𝑘′≤𝑘 , and 
𝑓(𝑝, 𝐿) ∈ 𝑅𝑙𝑆 is the excess aggregate demand vector and the consumption set for 
every consumer is {𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑙𝑠: (𝑝𝑖)(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜔𝑖), … . . , (𝑝𝑠)(𝑥𝑠 − 𝜔𝑠) ∈ 𝐿}. And the 
pair(𝑝, 𝐿) ∈ 𝑅++
𝑙𝑠 × ?̃?
𝑆,𝐾
, constitutes equilibrium if: 𝑓(𝑝, 𝐿) = 0, 𝐿 =
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛 (𝑔1(𝑝), … , 𝑔𝑘(𝑝)).  Return vector is 𝑔𝑘(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑖𝛼𝑘𝑖, … , 𝑝𝑠𝛼𝑘𝑠.And 
now if  𝐿 = 𝑅𝑆 , it is ok, with the result this is complete market case. And in 
such a case beyond Budget constraint there will be no restrictions on transfer 
of purchasing power across states of nature. However, since 𝐾 < 𝑆 this is 
incomplete market case. So , in general pair (𝑝, 𝐿) ∈ 𝑅++
𝑙𝑠 × ?̃?𝑆,𝐾, constitutes 
pseudo equilibrium if : 
a) 𝑓(𝑝, 𝐿) = 0 
b) 𝑔𝑘(𝑝) ∈ 𝐿, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ (𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 
(𝑝, 𝐿) is an equilibrium if {𝑔1(𝑝), … … … . , 𝑔𝑘(𝑝)} are linearly independent. About 
the questions of existence of pseudo equilibrium, first one can define unit norms such 
as: 𝑓(𝑝(𝐿), 𝐿) = 0 and 𝑔𝑖(𝐿) = 𝑔𝑖𝑃(𝐿). So given 𝐾 functions 𝑔𝑖: 𝐺
𝑆,𝐾 → 𝑅𝑆 there 
is an 𝐿 such that 𝑔𝑖(𝐿) ∈ 𝐿, ∀𝑖, also each function is continuous. One can define a 
section of the vector bundle 𝜎, and L yields equilibrium if and only if 𝜎(𝐿) =
𝜎0(𝐿), and 𝜎0  is zero intersection and a reason for establishing pseudo 
equilibrium, because every bundle must intersect at zero intersection. In  
Radner, R., (1972), setting stock price –share price system is (𝑝, 𝜗) , safe asset 
is 𝑟 = (𝑐1, … . , 𝑐𝑟), 𝑆 Arrow assets are : 𝑟𝑠𝑠 = 1, or 𝑟𝑘𝑠 = 0 ,the strike price 𝑐, 
at which put or call option can be exercised on primary asset 𝑟𝑘 is given by: 
{
𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = max (0, 𝑟𝑘𝑠 − 𝑐)1≤𝑠≤𝑆
𝑟𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = max (0, 𝑐 − 𝑟𝑘𝑠)1≤𝑠≤𝑆
. ∑ 𝑧𝑖
𝐾
𝑖=1 ∈ 𝑅
𝑘 is allowable contract 
                                                          
12 A Grassmann manifold is a certain collection of vector subspaces of a vector space. 
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(allowable portfolio of assets) , a commodity bundle is : ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑠 ∈ 𝑅+
𝐿𝑆𝐿𝑆
𝑖𝑠=1 . In 
equilibrium utility, function:𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝜗0(𝑓̅ − 𝑓0)𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖 = ?̃?𝑖, 𝑧𝑖𝑚𝑚 = ?̅?𝑖𝑚 −
?̃?𝑖𝑚 = 0, 𝑦𝑗 = ∑ (?̃?𝑖𝑚 − ?̅?𝑖𝑚) 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝑖 , Here 𝑚 are all such markets in the 
economy, ?̃?𝑖 is pseudo value of 𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑗 is the production function in economy, 
this function is maximized subject to: ∑ 𝜗𝑖𝑘𝑧𝑖𝑘 ≤ 0𝑘 , and  ∀𝑠, ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑠 =𝐼
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑠𝜔𝑖𝑙𝑠𝐼 + 𝜗𝑖𝑠 ∑ 𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑧𝑖𝑘𝑘 . In pseudo equilibrium allocation of resources and 
prices is:(𝑧, 𝑥) ∈ 𝑅𝑘𝐼 × 𝑅+
𝐿𝑆𝐼, (𝑝, 𝜗) ∈ 𝑅+
𝐾+𝐿𝑆.In market clearing in pseudo 
equilibrium ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑚
𝐼
𝑖=1 − ∑ ?̅?𝑖𝑚
𝐼
𝑖=1 ≫ 0, so that ∑ ?̃?𝑖𝑚
𝐼
𝑖=1 ≪ ∑ ?̅?𝑖𝑚
𝐼
𝑖=1 . 
Bottazzi, J.-M. and T. Hens (1996), obtain first SMD incomplete markets 
result. They use  Radner, R., (1972), but without short sale constraints. There 
are 𝑘 ≤ 𝑆 real assets, each of these assets can be purchased or sold at price,  
𝑞𝑘 at date 0. 𝐿 → 𝑧(𝐿) is a continuous homogenous function, 𝑧(𝐿) is excess 
demand function, also 𝐿 ∈ 𝐺++
𝑘 (𝑅𝑛) = {𝐿 ∈ 𝐺𝑘(𝑅𝑛), 𝐿 ∩ 𝑅+
𝑛 = {0}}, and 
𝑧(𝐿) ∈ 𝐿,there is an economy such that for every 𝐿 in a compact subset of 
𝐺++
𝑘 (𝑅𝑛), 𝑧(𝐿) is the aggregate excess demand function when consumers 
maximize their utility in their net trade span 𝐿 − 𝑅𝑛. Goods space dimension 
in this model is given as: 𝑚 = (𝑆 + 1)𝑙 , excess demand is given as :𝑧 =
(𝑧𝑜 , … . , 𝑧𝑠) ∈ ℝ
(𝑆+1)𝑙,also 𝐿 → 𝛽(𝐿)𝑒(𝐿), where 𝑒 is vector, and 𝑒(𝐿) is 
perpendicular or orthogonal projection of a Euclidean vector, 𝛽 is positive real 
valued function, and 𝛽(𝐿)𝑒(𝐿) is individual demand function. Budget set for 
every agent is given as: 𝛽(𝑝, 𝑞) = {𝑧 ∈ ℝ(𝑆+1)𝑙|𝜃 ∈ 𝑅𝑘, ?̅?𝑧0 + 𝜃𝑞 =
0, 𝑝𝑠𝑧𝑠 =  𝑝𝑠(𝐴𝑠𝜃𝑠), 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆}. In previous expression 𝜃 is portfolio 
consumption, 𝑞 is share price or security price, 𝐴𝑠 represents real assets. Now, 
proposition is set that 𝜋 ∈ ℝ(𝑆+1)𝑙 ∩ 𝐿(𝑝)⊥ = 𝐿(𝜆(𝑝)⊥: 𝐿(𝑝) = 𝐿(𝑧), where 
𝜋 is property of real assets, now since vector 𝑒 − 𝑒(𝑝) ∈ 𝐿(𝑝)⊥.Now, since  
𝑒 − 𝑒(𝑝) ∈ 𝐿(𝑝)⊥ > 0, 𝑒 − 𝑒(𝑝) ∈ 𝐿(𝑝)⊥ ∩ 𝐿(𝑝′)⊥.So, now 𝑒 − 𝑒(𝑝) is 
magnitude of incompleteness or the price of (𝑆 − 𝑘) which is the magnitude 
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of incompleteness. Now if 𝐿(?̅?) (maximal dimension of goods prices)13, has a 
maximal dimension, than every homogenous continuous function 𝑧 which 
satisfies Walras’ law i.e.𝑧(𝑝) ∈ 𝐿(𝑝) is the excess demand function of an 𝑚-
consumer economy in an equilibrium (or not equilibrium) price ?̅?. Now, 𝑚 
number of agents should be minimal. In a, one good finance models, with zero 
portfolio consumption 𝜃 = 0, following  utility of agents ?̃?(𝜃) = 𝑢(𝐴 ∗ 𝜃 +
𝜔) applies, where 𝜔 is resource endowment, and this utility function is 
maximized s.t. 𝑞 ∗ 𝜃 = 0. So that now number of goods minus magnitude of 
incompleteness is 𝑚 = (𝑆 + 1)𝑙 − (𝑆 − 𝑘) ,is 𝑚 = (𝑆 + 0)1 − (𝑆 − 𝑘) =
𝑘.Minimal number of consumers should be 𝑚 − 1.So that aggregate excess 
demand function is a sum from 1 to 𝑚  of all individual excess demand 
functions, in local of ?̅?,i.e. 𝑧(𝑝) = ∑ 𝛽𝑖(𝑝)𝑒𝑖(𝑝)
𝑚
𝑖=1 , this is generated in 
environment of strictly convex preferences. In previous expression, 𝛽𝑖(𝑝) ∈
𝑅++, 𝑒𝑖(𝑝) = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝐿(𝑝)(𝑒𝑖).There exist 𝑚 points (?̂?𝑖, … . , ?̂?𝑚) ∈ 𝐿(?̅?) in the 
interior of nonempty convex set (𝐶) 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛(𝐶): = {𝑝 ∈ 𝐶: ∀𝑞 ∈ 𝐶 ∃𝑞 >
1: 𝜆𝑝 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑞𝜖𝐶}.Direct sum of this convex preferences (𝑀 =
(𝐶(𝑒𝑖, … . , 𝑒𝑚) = 𝑒𝑚 + (𝑒1 − 𝑒𝑚, … , 𝑒𝑚−1 − 𝑒𝑚 and orthogonal 𝐿(𝑝)
⊥ goods 
space should equal goods space dimension, i.e. 𝑀 ⊕ 𝐿(𝑝)⊥ = ℝ(𝑆+1)𝑙. For 
every function 𝑧 for which Walras’ law, continuity and homogeneity applies, 
there exists neighbourhood of no arbitrage prices(?̅?, ?̅?), and ?̅?  is such that the 
return matrix has max rank, 𝑧  then is the aggregate excess demand function 
of 𝑚 economy. This result applies for 𝑚 − 1 consumers only. So now, law of 
one price applies only in the case 𝑧(𝑝) = ∑ 𝛽𝑖(𝑝)𝑒𝑖(𝑝)
𝑚−1
𝑖=1 .This is also critical 
proof for the RET theorem in the last section. Since, individual excess demand 
functions can be identified locally, the last proof applies to them also. Norm 
                                                          
13 ?̅? is such that the 𝑆 × 𝑘 matrix or 𝑝𝑠 ∗ 𝐴𝑠, has rank K. In the simplest case if it is 2 × 2 
matrix with two states 0 and 1 rank will be one i.e.  𝑘 = 1 
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defined here is 𝑝𝑒(𝑧) =
𝑒−?̅?
‖𝑒−?̅?‖
, where 𝑧̅ is the closest point from 𝑧 to 𝑒. And, 
𝑝𝑒(𝛽(?̅?)𝑒(?̅?)) = 𝜆?̅?, 𝛽(?̅?) = 1, 𝜆 > 0.Also defined is 𝐿(𝑝𝑒(𝑧)), and 𝑧 =
𝛽 (𝑝𝑒(𝑒(?̅?))) 𝑒(?̅?), andL𝐿 (𝑝𝑒(𝑒(?̅?))) 𝑒(?̅?) = 𝐿(𝑝) , this applies if 𝑝 = ?̅?, 
which is true in 𝐿(𝑝)⊥. 
Nonexistence of equilibrium in incomplete markets  
Hart, (1975), has shown that under standard assumptions equilibrium may not 
exist in incomplete markets. In this model there are two assets and tow states 
(ℓ = 2 and 𝑆 = 2 𝑜𝑟 3 ), in matrix form:𝑎11 = (1,0), 𝑎12 = (1,0), 𝑎21 =
(0,1), 𝑎22 = (0,1). Markets are complete when goods equals consumption set 
i.e. 𝐿 = 𝑅2, and if prices are not collinear, it means that the relative prices are 
not same. Otherwise 𝐿 > 0 and contains some positive vector,𝑓(𝑝, 𝐿(𝑝)) =
𝑓(𝑝, 0), it is as if no transfer was possible across the two states. Optimal 
portfolios are given as: 𝜑𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑅𝐾, optimal consumption plans are 𝑥𝑖
∗ =
{𝑥1𝑖
∗ , … . . , 𝑥1𝑆
∗  } is our case with two states and two dates : 𝑥1
𝑖 = 𝑅+
2  and 𝑥2
𝑖 =
𝑅+
2  are consumption of agent 𝑖, at date 1 and date 2. Spot markets open at date 
1 or 2 and futures market are costly to organize and futures are not permitted. 
There are no borrowing no lending possibilities and goods cannot be stored. 
Utility function here is: 𝑈𝑖(𝑥1
𝑖 , 𝑥2
𝑖 ) = 𝑉𝑖(𝑥1
𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝑖𝑊𝑖(𝑥2
𝑖 ). Endowments of 
agents at date 1 and 2 are given as : 𝜔1
𝑖 ∈ 𝑅+
2  and 𝜔2
𝑖 ∈ 𝑅+
2  . And utility 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥1
𝑖 , 𝑥2
𝑖 ) is maximized subject to: 𝑝1𝑥1
𝑖 ≤  𝑝1𝜔1
𝑖  and 𝑝2𝑥2
𝑖 ≤  𝑝2𝜔2
𝑖  and 
𝑥1
𝑖 , 𝑥2
𝑖 ≥ 0. Price system also is ordered pair:(𝑝, 𝑞) , 𝑝 is a goods price system 
and 𝑞 is security price system. Securities indexation is: 𝑓 = 𝐹 + 1, … . , 𝐹 + 𝐺, 
and security 𝑓 is represented by a functions 𝑎2
𝑓 , 𝑎3
𝑓
 that map S into 𝑅+
𝐻 which 
is set of goods in the economy. 𝑎2
𝑓 , 𝑎3
𝑓
 we consider like dividends which 
security pays. If consumer holds 𝜑 units of security 𝑓 and if state 𝑠 occurs, the 
consumer will receive vector of goods 𝜑𝑎3
𝑓
 at date 3. At this date futures 
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market close, and goods markets open. Security trading plan for agent 𝑖 is 
given as: 𝜑𝑖 = 𝜑1
𝑖 , 𝜑2
𝑖 . At first date (1) budget constraint is: 𝑝1(𝑠)𝑥1
𝑖 (𝑠) +
𝑞1(𝑠)𝜑1
𝑖 (𝑠) ≤ 𝑝1(𝑠)𝜔1
𝑖 (𝑠). At second date budget constrain is: 𝑝2(𝑠)𝑥2
𝑖 (𝑠) +
𝑞2(𝑠)𝜑2
𝑖 (𝑠) ≤ 𝑝2(𝑠)𝜔2
𝑖 (𝑠) + 𝑝2(𝑠)(∑ 𝜑1
𝑓(𝑠)+𝑎2
𝑓𝐹
𝑓=1 ) + ∑ 𝑞2𝑓(𝑠)𝜑1
𝑓(𝑠)𝐹𝑓=1  
or 𝑝3(𝑠)𝑥3
𝑖 (𝑠) ≤ 𝑝3(𝑠)𝜔3
𝑖 (𝑠) + 𝑝3(𝑠)(∑ 𝜑2𝑓
𝑖 (𝑠)+𝑎3
𝑓(𝑠)𝐹+𝐺𝑓=1 ).And therefore 
for a consumption allocation is said to be Pareto optimal if it is not Pareto 
dominated by other array of consumption plans, that is : 𝑈𝑖(𝑥′𝑖) =
𝑈𝑖(𝑥𝑖), ∀𝑖.But because the goods in economy are gross substitutes, following 
rule applies : ↓ 𝑝 ⇒↓ 𝑥, and if ↑ 𝑝 ⇒↑ 𝑥 , also 
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑝
> 0.Therefore, 
𝑞1(𝑠)
𝑞2(𝑠)
=
𝑝1(𝑠)
𝑝2(𝑠)
 
for 𝑠 = 1,2. And in equilibrium,
𝑝1(1)
𝑝2(1)
=
𝑝1(2)
𝑝2(2)
= 1, this contradicts assumption 
in equilibrium that 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are linearly independent. Second case in 
equilibrium is if 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are linearly dependent. There is only one security 
at date 1 and therefore there is no way of transferring wealth from state 1 to 
state 2, and we are assuming that in equilibrium there is no trading at date 1.  
Prices are normalized to unity meaning that 𝑝(1) = (
1
3
,
2
3
) and 𝑝(2) = (
2
3
,
1
3
), 
so they are linearly independent vectors .And since two cases are being ruled 
out means that there is no possible equilibrium for this economy.  
Taxes and incomplete markets  
Government produces nothing, imposes tax and collects taxes, and distributes 
proceeds, and receives net income:𝑔𝑟 = 𝑡 ∗ ?̅? − ∑ 𝑔
ℎ
𝐻 . In previous 
expression 𝑔ℎ are net lump sum government transfers to household ℎ,14 and 
                                                          
14 ℎ is a part fo the consumption vector 𝑥ℎ = (𝑥1
ℎ, ?̅?ℎ), ?̅?ℎ is the consumption of the 
numeraire good. Utility is equal: 𝑢ℎ(𝑥ℎ, 𝜗ℎ), 𝜗ℎ are other variables that affect utility such 
as: levels of pollution, average quality of a good consumed. 𝜗ℎ = 𝛽ℎ𝑡1𝑥1, 𝛽
ℎ  is the share of 
tax received back by some household ℎ, and ∑ 𝛽ℎ = 1𝐻 .Tax proceed redistributions are 
“externalities” to each household.  
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taxes are the difference between produced and consumed goods: 𝑡 ≡ (𝑥ℎ −
𝑥𝑝). Now differentiating government revenue 𝑔𝑟 with respect to 𝑡 of the 
previous expression gives the following result: 
𝑑𝑔𝑟
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
∗ 𝑡 − ∑ 𝑔ℎ𝐻 . Also. 
?̅? = ∑ ?̅?ℎ𝐻  (sum of numeraire consumption). Stiglitz et al. (1986), further 
defines 
𝑑𝑔ℎ
𝑑𝑡
 to be  a change in lump sum income per unit change in tax, 𝐸𝜗
ℎ =
 [
𝜕𝐸ℎ
𝜕𝜗ℎ
] = [
𝜕𝑢ℎ
𝜕𝜗ℎ
] , expenditure function of the household that gives minimum 
expenditure necessary to obtain level of utility 𝑢ℎ, 𝜋𝑧
𝑓 =
𝜕𝑌𝑓
𝜕𝜗ℎ
 , is the firms 
profit function. In the last expression of the derivative of government revenues 
to income this part is: ∑ 𝑔ℎ𝐻 = ?̅? − (∑ 𝜋𝑧
𝑓 𝑑𝑧𝑓
𝑑𝑡𝐹
− ∑ 𝐸𝜗
ℎ 𝑑𝑧
ℎ
𝑑𝑡𝐻
) .𝐹 and 𝑓’s are 
firms. Or if Π𝑡 = 𝜋𝑧
𝑓 𝑑𝜗𝑓
𝑑𝑡
, 𝐵𝑡 = 𝐸𝜗
ℎ 𝑑𝜗
𝑓
𝑑𝑡
,For the equilibrium to be optimal 
following condition should apply: 
𝑑𝑔𝑟
𝑑𝑡
= (Π𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡) = 0. As for the optimal 
taxes one has: 
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
∗ 𝑡 = −(Π𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡) ⇒ 𝑡 = −(Π𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡) (
𝑑?̅?
𝑑𝑡
)
−1
. Now if 
markets are incomplete as in previous definition in Arrow-Debreu sense, then 
changes in demand change market prices will change the nature of composite 
product, so externalities will exist and adverse selection will apply to the 
economy. In Stiglitz model there are two period only. In the  𝑆(2) = 𝑘  and 
𝑆 = 0,1,2 , vector of prices is : 𝑝 = 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … … , 𝑝𝑘.Family holdings in period 
zero are : 𝑊0
ℎ, and household utility is: 𝑈ℎ(𝑊0
ℎ; 𝑝) =
∑ 𝑢2𝑘
ℎ
𝑘 (𝑥𝑘
ℎ∗; 𝑊0
ℎ , 𝑝𝑘)Ψ𝑘 , where 𝑢2𝑘
ℎ  is the utility of the consumption of good 
in period 2, 𝑥𝑘
ℎ∗ is the vector of consumption that maximizes household utility 
function at period 2, Ψ𝑘 is probability that state 𝑘 materializes. This expression 
is subject to constraint: 𝑝𝑘?̃?𝑘
ℎ ≤ 0, ?̃?𝑘
ℎ is the individuals  (second period) net 
traded vector, for commodity zero: ?̃?0𝑘
ℎ = ?̃?0𝑘
ℎ∗ − 𝑊0
ℎ. Fotr other commodities: 
?̃?𝑗𝑘
ℎ = ?̃?𝑗𝑘
ℎ∗ − 𝑊𝑗
ℎ.Household two period utility is a sum of utilities in the  two 
14 
 
periods:  𝑢ℎ(𝑊0
ℎ; 𝑝) = 𝑢1
ℎ(?̅?ℎ − 𝑊0
ℎ) + 𝑈ℎ(𝑊0
ℎ; 𝑝), where ?̅?ℎ − 𝑊0
ℎ 
denotes consumption in period 1 of store of value of good, ?̅?ℎ   is the total 
initial endowment of the good. Now in therms of incomplete market with two 
period utilities we can rewrite the 
𝑑𝑔𝑟
𝑑𝑡
 expression as: 
𝑑𝑔𝑟
𝑑𝑡
= ∑ ∑
𝑑𝐸ℎ𝑑𝑝𝑘
𝑑𝑝𝑘𝑑𝑡
Ψ𝑘 =𝑘𝐻
∑ (∑ ?̃?𝑘
ℎ
ℎ ∗
𝑚𝑘
ℎ
𝑈1
ℎ )𝑘
𝑑𝑝𝑘
𝑑𝑡
Ψ𝑘, where 𝑚𝑘
ℎ is marginal utility of income to household 
ℎ when 𝑠 = 𝑘 state is realized .So in conclusion there will exist taxes that 
improve overall welfare.   
Law of one price on securities  
The payoff matrix of all Arrow securities must be identity (unit) matrix, 
Lengwiler (2004). In the common example the payoff matrix, that is collection 
of all Arrow type securities (elementary assets),15 𝑆 is unit matrix, i.e. integer 
matrix consisting of all 1𝑠,  𝑒 ≔ [1, {𝑚, 𝑛}]. And det(𝑚, 𝑛) ≠ 0, and trace 
matrix should be 𝑡𝑟(𝑒) = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑆
𝑠=1 . In the same time Arrow prices are given 
as:𝛼 = [𝑎1, … . , 𝑎𝑠]. Each of these Arrow prices, are given as product of 
financial markets prices and 𝐴−1 ,or inverse matrix of the matrix of returns, 
(markets are only complete if returns matrix is invertible),  or ∏ 𝑞 ∙𝑆𝑠=1
𝐴(𝑒𝑖)
−1.Now risk free rate of return (risk free interest rate)is equal to :𝜌 − 1 =
1
∑ 𝑎1,𝑠
𝑆
𝑠=1
 , where ∑ 𝑎1,𝑠
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝛽 , and now risk neutral probabilities ?̃?𝑠are given 
as:  ?̃?𝑠 ≔ 𝜌𝑎𝑠. About the decomposition of the price of the option, one has: 
𝑞𝑗 = 𝑎𝑟
𝑗. For the law of one price to holds, transaction costs must not exists, 
and there must be no bid-ask spread. And if two portfolios, produce the same 
cash flow 𝑟 ∗ 𝑧 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝑧′ , than they must also cost the same 𝑞 ∗ 𝑧 = 𝑞 ∗ 𝑧′.Risk 
neutral pricing is given as :𝑅𝑗
𝑠 ≔
𝑟𝑠
𝑗
𝑞𝑗
 ,where 𝑅𝑗
𝑠 is the gross rate of return of 
                                                          
15 Contingent claims denominated in dollars, derivative with a payout that is dependent on 
the realization of some uncertain future event.(options, swaps, future contracts etc.). 
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asset 𝑗 .Expected rate of return of any asset ,evaluated with risk neutral 
probabilities is given as :?̂?{𝑅𝑗} = 𝜌 .Here please note that: 𝜌 = 𝛽−1. Asset 
span in the economy is given as:ℳ = {𝑧 ∈ 𝑅𝑠 ≔ 𝑧 = ℎ𝑅 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 ℎ ∈ 𝑅𝑗} 
, ℳ ⊆ 𝑅𝑠, in previous case markets are incomplete, but for markets to be 
complete ℳ = 𝑅𝑠. In the asset span of the economy function ℎ denotes 
holdings of security 𝑗, while ℎ𝑅 denotes portfolio of payoffs ∑ ℎ𝑗𝑟𝑗𝑗 . Now, 1 ∈
ℳ is risk free payoff, riskless assets exists only when markets are complete. 
Let remember that,𝜑(𝜆𝑝) = 𝜑(𝑝), and 𝜆 = 1, for excess demand function to 
be homogenous so one can denote payoff  as:𝜆1 ∈ 𝑅𝑆 , 𝜆 ∈ 𝑅 is state 
independent claim and 𝑞𝑠 ≡ 𝑞(𝑒𝑠), and ℳ = {𝑞𝜃: 𝑞 ∈ 𝑅
𝑗}.If there exist two 
states 𝑠 and 𝑠′ 𝑟𝑠
𝑗 ≠ 𝑟𝑠′
𝑗
 . 
Tax cuts and fiscal policy  
Tax cut is defined as: ?̃?0 − 𝜏0 = −𝑑, and it is financed through debt, ?̃? − 𝜏 =
(1 + 𝑟)𝑑 = −(1 + 𝑟)?̃?0 − 𝜏0. Formally Ricardian equivalence to holds 
following applies: Φ(𝑡) = 𝑑(𝑡) − ∫ (𝜏(𝑡̅) − 𝐺(
∞
𝑡
𝑡̅) ∙ 𝑒−𝑟𝐴(𝑡,?̅?)𝑑𝑡 = 016. 
Government debt is equal to ?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡)𝑑(𝑡) + 𝐺(𝑡) − 𝜏(𝑡), Heijdra, B.J., 
F.Van Der Ploeg, (2002). In the first period tax cut is financed through debt, 
but in the second period taxes are increased, by the principal plus interest due 
on the issued debt. Tax cut should leave present value of government spending 
unchanged, but the risk free payoff paying (1 + 𝑟) , does not mean that the 
risk free payoff belongs to the asset span, since 𝑟 > 0 is exogenously 
determined, and it might or might not belong to the asset span ℳ, Divino, 
Orillo,(2017). Asset prices are 𝑞𝜃 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑗
, tax obligations are given as: 𝜏 =
(𝜏0, 𝑡1) ∈ 𝑅++
1+𝑆 ∀ℎ ∈ 𝐻, and max
(𝑥0,?̃?𝑠)∈𝛽ℎ(𝑞,ℳ,𝜏)
𝑈ℎ = (𝑥0, ?̃?𝑠), s.t. 2 period 
                                                          
16 Actuarial revenue is 𝑟𝐴(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡) + 𝑀(𝑡) , where 𝑀(𝑡) is instant probability for death.  
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constraint:𝑥0 + 𝑞𝜃 = 𝜔𝑜
ℎ − 𝑡𝑜 ; 𝑥𝑠 = 𝜔𝑠
ℎ + 𝑞𝑠𝜃 − 𝑡𝑠,taxpayer budget set it is 
defined as: 𝛽ℎ(𝑞, ℳ, 𝜏) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑅+
1+𝑆: ∃𝑧 ∈ ℳ}: 𝑥0 − 𝜔0
ℎ + ?̃?0 = −𝑞𝜃, ?̃?𝑠 −
?̃?𝑠
ℎ + ?̃?𝑠1 = 𝑧, 𝑞: ℳ → 𝑅. If the tax cut previously defined is enacted then we 
will have: 𝑥0 − 𝜔0
ℎ + ?̃?0 = −𝑞𝜃 − 𝑑, ?̃?𝑠 − ?̃?𝑠
ℎ + ?̃?𝑠 = 𝑞𝜃 + (1 + 𝑟)𝑑.So , 
now question here is whether agents can neutralize (1 + 𝑟)𝑑 , and not that 
government bonds are net wealth as in Barro,(1974). For the law of one price 
to apply here 𝛽ℎ(𝑞, ℳ, 𝜏) = 𝛽ℎ(𝑞, ℳ, ?̃?), ∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑅𝑠, ∃𝑧(𝑠′) = 𝑧 + (1 +
𝑟)𝑑1 ∈ ℳ . RET holds if and only if it does not affect the individual demand 
sets defined as: 𝜑ℎ(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝜏) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝛽ℎ(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝜏): ¬∃𝑥′ ∈ 𝛽ℎ(𝑝, 𝑞, 𝜏): 𝑈ℎ(𝑥′) >
𝑈ℎ(𝑥)}. The last expression is in line with the second welfare theorem where 
if economy is specified by:  
Equation 10 
({𝑥 ≿𝑗}𝑗=1
𝑗
, {𝑥′}𝑠=1
𝑆 , 𝜔𝑜
ℎ) , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑥, 𝑥′), ∃𝑝 = (𝑝1, … 𝑝𝑠)⋁𝑞 = (𝑞1, … 𝑞𝑠 ≠
0, ∃(𝜔1, … 𝜔𝑠), ∑ 𝜔𝑠 = 𝑝𝜔𝑠
ℎ
𝑠 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥′𝑖 ,  
Previous constitutes pseudoequilibrium with transfers and that is: 
∀𝑠, 𝑥′, max 𝑝𝑥𝑠 ≤ 𝑝𝑥
′, ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝑅+
𝑆 , and ∀𝑗, 𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑗 ≻ 𝑥𝑗
′ ∥ 𝑞𝑗𝑥𝑗 ≥ 𝜔𝑗 and ∑ 𝑥′𝑠 =𝑠
𝜔𝑠
ℎ + ∑ 𝑥𝑗
′
𝑗 .In such a case 𝜆𝑥 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥′ ∈ 𝑅++
1+𝑠 ∈ ℝ𝑁 is convex where 𝜆 ∈
[0,1].This is also known as Separating hyperplanes theorem in other words, 
𝑅++
1+𝑠 ⊂ ℝ𝑁 is convex if it contains two vectors 𝑥 and 𝑥′ , and a segment that 
connects them. Now, law of one price holds if 1 ∈ ℳ , but in the model public 
debt is not available for consumers to purchase. Only risky assets are available 
for them to try to replicate risk free payoff. RET does not hold if 1 ∉ ℳ. Now 
if we define:  
Equation 11  
Imℳ = {𝑞(𝑒1, … . . , 𝑒𝑗) ∈ (𝑅
𝑆)𝑗: 𝐹(𝑧) = 𝑞 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑧 ∈ 𝑉}
Kerℳ = 𝑧 ∈ 𝑉: 𝐹(𝑧) = 0
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Set of linear mapping function would be given as:  
Equation 12 
ℱ = {(𝑒1, … . . , 𝑒𝑗) ∈ (𝑅
𝑆)𝑗: 𝑞(𝑒1, … . . , 𝑒𝑗) = 0} 
We note here that Fourier transform of a common function  is given 
as:ℱ𝑥[1](𝑘) = ∫ 𝑒
−2𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑥𝑑𝑥 = 𝛿(𝑘)
+∞
−∞
, or Fourier transformation of a delta 
function is : ℱ𝑥[𝛿(𝑥 − 𝑥0)(𝑘)] = ∫ 𝑒
−2𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑥+∞
−∞
𝛿(𝑥 − 𝑥0)𝑑𝑥 = 𝑒
−2𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑥, 
ℱ𝑥
−1 = 𝛿[(𝑥)𝑘] = ∫ 𝛿(𝑥)𝑒2𝜋𝑖𝑘𝑥𝑑𝑥 = 1
+∞
−∞
. Now since, (𝑅𝑆)𝑗 = 1 , in our 
case Fourier transform of one is 1, since Rank(𝑅𝑆) = 1.If 𝐾𝑒𝑟(ℳ) = 0, than 
its dimension is given as: dim(𝐾𝑒𝑟ℳ) = dim(𝐾𝑁) − dim(𝐼𝑚ℳ) = 𝑛 −
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(ℳ) = 1 − 1 = 0.This is actually the distance (1ℳ). Now since delta 
function, is continuous and is close there exists complement of 𝑆 which is an 
open set. In this open set one cannot expect to replicate risk free payoffs. This 
is because the complement set has its own limit points, and has its own set 
closure, has its own neighborhood, disjoint of 𝑆, Croft, Falconer, and Guy, 
K.(1991) ℛ ⊂ 𝑅𝐽𝑆, ∀(𝑒1, … . . , 𝑒𝑗), Rankℳ = 0, RET fails.Since the set of 
endogenous variables is :Θ ≔ {𝜃 ∈ 𝑅𝐽: 𝑞𝜃 = 1}, since the rank of 𝑉 is full 
(vectors are linearly dependent), and it is an injective transformation. 
Therefore, the Lebesque measure is:𝜇𝐿(𝑆
′) = (𝑏 − 𝑎) − ∑ (𝑏𝑘 − 𝑎𝑘)𝑘 = 0. 
Hence, agent cannot replicate risk free payoff.  
Concluding remarks  
This paper proved that if the law of one price holds than RET holds if agents 
are able to replicate risk free payoffs. The result is applied on the incomplete 
markets model. Under the law of one price agents are not affected by the 
changes of fiscal policy in terms of the risk free payoff as long as that payoff 
18 
 
belongs to the fixed payoff matrix. But if columns 𝐽 of payoff matrix vary law 
of one price will not hold, hence RET will not hold too. 
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